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Effective communications are today recognised as central not simply to achieving foreign policy or diplomatic success, but to realising any and all strategic aims. Consequently, strategic communications professionals play a critical role in a wide range of government agencies. In the light of an ever-transforming global media ecology, and the proliferation of state and non-state political actors who are able effectively to intervene in this ?uid communications space, this observation has rising salience for international relations as a whole. Faced with rising geopolitical tensions, and public anxiety associated with terrorism, strategic communications has been viewed as an essential component of an effective response to campaigns by hostile state and non-state actors seeking to shape public opinion and attitudes in pursuit of their own strategic objectives. This article asks whether NATO members have given sufficient thought to the ethical puzzles raised by the changing landscape of strategic communications for international relations practitioners, and seeks to shed light on the practical ethical challenges faced by all strategic communicators in international relations today. We argue that effective strategic communication is an action that necessarily takes place within, and draws its efficacy from, ethical architectures that are settled constitutive features of international practices.

Contrary to the narrative in much of politics and academia, Russia’s alienation from the West did not start in 2014—it is a lasting and inherent phenomenon. Since the mid-1990s, Moscow’s attempts to ‘capture’ the narrative of Europe or even portray itself later on as a ‘better Europe’, transcended in 2014 into a more overt and antithetical approach of strategically juxtaposing Russia versus Europe, or placing ‘Russia being not (declinist and decadent) Europe’, a part of the likewise allegedly declining ‘West’. Russia’s appeal for European ‘self-denial’ does not only find its supporters in Europe, predominantly populist and radical parties, but also contributes to a more general frustration among Europeans regarding their own self-perception, as well provokes Western ambiguity and uncertainty about its responsibility for regional security affairs, particularly in the European neighbourhood. This article argues that, by destabilising the immediate vicinity and regional security order, the Russian leadership does not pursue a policy of balancing the Western hegemonic formation, thus strategising a positive competing (counter-hegemonic) framework. Rather, it engages in an anti-hegemonic strategy through a deeply negative spoiler offensive. The article conceptualises Russia’s anti-hegemonic drive as a three-pronged strategic narrative offensive that operationally seeks to 1) ‘desynchronise’ political developments in the European Neighbourhood to ‘distort’ European perceptions of reality; 2) ‘de-articulate’ the West, i.e., splitting the Atlantic democracies from the European mainland; and 3) ‘saturate’ the vacuum with false and fictitious narratives, to sow confusion and maintain manageable disorder.

During the last decade, ‘information warfare’ has become a much-politicised term in Russian domestic and foreign affairs. This article sheds light on the conceptual roots that have been shaping this idea in the Russian academic, political, and public discourse. Moreover, the article points to the major actors leading the politicisation of this idea by promoting narratives describing the so-called ‘Western information war against Russia’. In the context of Russia’s contemporary attempts to re-establish itself as a global power and Western fear and distress associated with Russian activities in the information domain, a grounded understanding of the major conceptual narratives in?uencing Russian thinking about information warfare, as well as perspectives on how these narratives have been politicised, is of paramount importance.

social media is increasingly used to communicate strategic information during crises and to enable authorities to act tactfully. Numerous journalistic accounts have highlighted the prolifc and disturbing use of social media by deviant groups among state and non-state actors to in?uence public opinion and provoke hysteria among citizens through disseminating misinformation or propaganda about various in?uential events such as the 2014 Crimean Water Crisis or the 2015 Dragoon Ride Exercise. We study the strategic communication used by deviant groups within the social media ecosystem, especially examining the cross-in?uence between blogs and Twitter. We have collected and analysed data from blogs and Twitter during the two aforementioned events. Our study shows that networked computers running automated and coordinated programs to perform specifc tasks, or ‘botnets’ have been extensively used during the two events, greatly increasing the dissemination of propaganda. Furthermore, the behaviours of these botnets are becoming increasingly sophisticated over time, both from the perspective of information dissemination as well as coordination. The evolving behaviours of botnets make them elusive, even to state-of-the-art detection techniques, warranting more sophisticated botnet detection methodologies. In this study, we present methodologies informed by social science and computational network analysis to study the information dissemination and coordination behaviours of botnets and to aid the development of detection tools ready for deployment in cyber operations.

This article poses an unsettling question. Was Hitler’s regime not so much a historical accident as a prototype—a creation of modernity and a response to the conditions precipitated by modernity? It constructs an answer via the exploration of the interdependency of a number of constructs. Through the building blocks of symbolism the propagandist constructs an imaginary world that is neither true nor false, but a pseudo-reality energised by the emotion of fear and both defined and constricted by ideology and beliefs. The article highlights significant differences between this Nazi prototype and modern practice to be taken into account. For example the Nazis had no theory of soft power; however, they were much more aware of the value of entertainment as propaganda than contemporary populist autocracies. The article promotes a rigorous examination of the evidence for the ‘impact’ of propaganda—How effective is it really?—and the need for a more sophisticated understanding of its effects and purpose

Effective communications are today recognised as central not simply to achieving foreign policy or diplomatic success, but to realising any and all strategic aims. Consequently, strategic communications professionals play a critical role in a wide range of government agencies. In the light of an ever-transforming global media ecology, and the proliferation of state and non-state political actors who are able effectively to intervene in this fluid communications space, this observation has rising salience for international relations as a whole. Faced with rising geopolitical tensions, and public anxiety associated with terrorism, strategic communications has been viewed as an essential component of an effective response to campaigns by hostile state and non-state actors seeking to shape public opinion and attitudes in pursuit of their own strategic objectives. This article asks whether NATO members have given sufficient thought to the ethical puzzles raised by the changing landscape of strategic communications for international relations practitioners, and seeks to shed light on the practical ethical challenges faced by all strategic communicators in international relations today. We argue that effective strategic communication is an action that necessarily takes place within, and draws its efficacy from, ethical architectures that are settled constitutive features of international practices.

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Contrary to the narrative in much of politics and academia, Russia’s alienation from the West did not start in 2014—it is a lasting and inherent phenomenon. Since the mid-1990s, Moscow’s attempts to ‘capture’ the narrative of Europe or even portray itself later on as a ‘better Europe’, transcended in 2014 into a more overt and antithetical approach of strategically juxtaposing Russia versus Europe, or placing ‘Russia being not (declinist and decadent) Europe’, a part of the likewise allegedly declining ‘West’. Russia’s appeal for European ‘self-denial’ does not only find its supporters in Europe, predominantly populist and radical parties, but also contributes to a more general frustration among Europeans regarding their own self-perception, as well provokes Western ambiguity and uncertainty about its responsibility for regional security affairs, particularly in the European neighbourhood. This article argues that, by destabilising the immediate vicinity and regional security order, the Russian leadership does not pursue a policy of balancing the Western hegemonic formation, thus strategising a positive competing (counter-hegemonic) framework. Rather, it engages in an anti-hegemonic strategy through a deeply negative spoiler offensive. The article conceptualises Russia’s anti-hegemonic drive as a three-pronged strategic narrative offensive that operationally seeks to 1) ‘desynchronise’ political developments in the European Neighbourhood to ‘distort’ European perceptions of reality; 2) ‘de-articulate’ the West, i.e., splitting the Atlantic democracies from the European mainland; and 3) ‘saturate’ the vacuum with false and fictitious narratives, to sow confusion and maintain manageable disorder.

During the last decade, ‘information warfare’ has become a much-politicised term in Russian domestic and foreign affairs. This article sheds light on the conceptual roots that have been shaping this idea in the Russian academic, political, and public discourse. Moreover, the article points to the major actors leading the politicisation of this idea by promoting narratives describing the so-called ‘Western information war against Russia’. In the context of Russia’s contemporary attempts to re-establish itself as a global power and Western fear and distress associated with Russian activities in the information domain, a grounded understanding of the major conceptual narratives influencing Russian thinking about information warfare, as well as perspectives on how these narratives have been politicised, is of paramount importance

Social media is increasingly used to communicate strategic information during crises and to enable authorities to act tactfully. Numerous journalistic accounts have highlighted the prolific and disturbing use of social media by deviant groups among state and non-state actors to influence public opinion and provoke hysteria among citizens through disseminating misinformation or propaganda about various influential events such as the 2014 Crimean Water Crisis or the 2015 Dragoon Ride Exercise. We study the strategic communication used by deviant groups within the social media ecosystem, especially examining the cross-influence between blogs and Twitter. We have collected and analysed data from blogs and Twitter during the two aforementioned events. Our study shows that networked computers running automated and coordinated programs to perform specific tasks, or ‘botnets’ have been extensively used during the two events, greatly increasing the dissemination of propaganda. Furthermore, the behaviours of these botnets are becoming increasingly sophisticated over time, both from the perspective of information dissemination as well as coordination. The evolving behaviours of botnets make them elusive, even to state-of-the-art detection techniques, warranting more sophisticated botnet detection methodologies. In this study, we present methodologies informed by social science and computational network analysis to study the information dissemination and coordination behaviours of botnets and to aid the development of detection tools ready for deployment in cyber operations.

In strategic communications, dominated by concerns about the use and meaning of words, messages, images, and symbols for strategic influence and effect, there is growing recognition of the importance of empathy, but a limited understanding of what it might look like. Defined in its simplest form as the attempt to understand the perspectives, experiences, and feelings of another, empathy is both a communicative and a performative act. Its value is dependent on its ability to be demonstrated and understood, and its power can be harnessed by governments to connect with a wider audience and develop more responsive policies. This article examines the varied dynamics of empathy through the lens of American politics at domestic and international levels. It argues that empathy is a multifaceted and complex concept with transformative power, but also with practical and political limitations, which deserves far greater attention from strategic communications practitioners.

This article poses an unsettling question. Was Hitler’s regime not so much a historical accident as a prototype—a creation of modernity and a response to the conditions precipitated by modernity? It constructs an answer via the exploration of the interdependency of a number of constructs. Through the building blocks of symbolism the propagandist constructs an imaginary world that is neither true nor false, but a pseudo-reality energised by the emotion of fear and both defined and constricted by ideology and beliefs. The article highlights significant differences between this Nazi prototype and modern practice to be taken into account. For example the Nazis had no theory of soft power; however, they were much more aware of the value of entertainment as propaganda than contemporary populist autocracies. The article promotes a rigorous examination of the evidence for the ‘impact’ of propaganda—How effective is it really?—and the need for a more sophisticated understanding of its effects and purpose.

Communications practitioners continue to see strategic narrative as vital to securing domestic support or opposition to war. Yet despite an extensive literature on the narratives states construct, the stories domestic citizens tell about war are rarely examined. Consequently, the formation of strategic narratives is only informed by the stories governments think citizens tell, rather than those they actually tell. This paper presents a qualitative analysis of the stories the British public tell about their country’s role in war. Focusing on genre—the general pattern of a given story—it reveals five narratives citizens use to interpret Britain’s military role. These portray Britain as Punching Above its Weight; a Vanishing Force; Learning from its Mistakes; being Led Astray, or a Selfish Imperialist. At a time of uncertainty about Britain’s international role following the ‘Brexit’ vote, it provides an in-depth perspective on a state where military intervention is commonplace but understanding of public interpretations of war remains limited.

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In strategic communications, dominated by concerns about the use and meaning of words, messages, images, and symbols for strategic in?uence and effect, there is growing recognition of the importance of empathy, but a limited understanding of what it might look like. Defined in its simplest form as the attempt to understand the perspectives, experiences, and feelings of another, empathy is both a communicative and a performative act. Its value is dependent on its ability to be demonstrated and understood, and its power can be harnessed by governments to connect with a wider audience and develop more responsive policies. This article examines the varied dynamics of empathy through the lens of American politics at domestic and international levels. It argues that empathy is a multifaceted and complex concept with transformative power, but also with practical and political limitations, which deserves far greater attention from strategic communications practitioners.

Communications practitioners continue to see strategic narrative as vital to securing domestic support or opposition to war. Yet despite an extensive literature on the narratives states construct, the stories domestic citizens tell about war are rarely examined. Consequently, the formation of strategic narratives is only informed by the stories governments think citizens tell, rather than those they actually tell. This paper presents a qualitative analysis of the stories the British public tell about their country’s role in war. Focusing on genre—the general pattern of a given story—­ it reveals five narratives citizens use to interpret Britain’s military role. These portray Britain as Punching Above its Weight; a Vanishing Force; Learning from its Mistakes; being Led Astray, or a Selfish Imperialist. At a time of uncertainty about Britain’s international role following the ‘Brexit’ vote, it provides an in­depth perspective on a state where military intervention is commonplace but understanding of public interpretations of war remains limited.

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For many months now Russia has engaged its domestic and international audiences in a massive information campaign. The goal of the campaign is to persuade and in?uence local and foreign populations that Russian territorial claims in Ukraine are based on legitimate responses to world events. This media offensive has used both old and new forms of persuasion to strategically communicate its goals. This article discusses the components of Russia’s information war offensive to in?uence Western and domestic opinion. Russia is accomplishing this information war both at home and abroad through a number of methods that will be described in the paper.

For many months now Russia has engaged its domestic and international audiences in a massive information campaign. The goal of the campaign is to persuade and in?uence local and foreign populations that Russian territorial claims in Ukraine are based on legitimate responses to world events. This media offensive has used both old and new forms of persuasion to strategically communicate its goals. This article discusses the components of Russia’s information war offensive to in?uence Western and domestic opinion. Russia is accomplishing this information war both at home and abroad through a number of methods that will be described in the paper.